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strides in developing a methodology, which over time may become a worldwide model. The current status 
of all key areas of the SAFER code has been logically developed and is defensible.  Continued 
improvement and refinement can be expected as implementation proceeds. A consistent approach to 
addressing and refining uncertainty in each of the primary areas (probability of event, consequences of 
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Safety Assessment for Explosives Risk 
(SAFER) 
Peer Review Report 2004 
1 Executive Summary 
At the direction of the Department of Defense Explosives Safety Board (DDESB), a Peer Review Team 
was established to review the status of development of the risk-based explosives safety siting process and 
criteria as currently implemented in the software “Safety Assessment for Explosive Risk (SAFER)” 
Version 2.1. The Peer Review Team members were subject-matter experts in the primary technical 
components of the SAFER model. Peer Review Team member’s resumes are found at Appendix A. 
 
The objective of the Peer Review Team was to provide an independent evaluation of the components of 
the SAFER model, the ongoing development of the model and the risk assessment process and criteria.  
This peer review addressed procedures; protocols; physical and statistical science algorithms; related 
documents; and software quality assurance, validation and verification. The peer reviewers looked at the 
status of open actions from the previous Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) peer review.  The 
peer reviewers were not restricted from offering observations or findings outside the overall objective if it 
would benefit overall program development. The review considered the program management goal of 
“Transparency, Clarity, Consistency, and Reasonableness” (TCCR). 
1.1 Summary 
Overall, the risk-based method represents a major improvement in the Department of Defense (DoD) 
approach to explosives safety management. The DDESB and Risk Based Explosives Safety Criteria Team 
(RBESCT) have made major strides in developing a methodology, which over time may become a 
worldwide model. The current status of all key areas of the SAFER code has been logically developed 
and is defensible.  Continued improvement and refinement can be expected as implementation proceeds. 
A consistent approach to addressing and refining uncertainty in each of the primary areas (probability of 
event, consequences of event and exposure) will be a very beneficial future activity. 
 
The following major issues were addressed in some detail: 
 
1. Does SAFER adequately address and implement physical science models for the explosion effects 
and consequences for both personnel and structures? 
 
Findings:   The development of physical science algorithms represents widely accepted methods, 
and the subject-matter experts (SMEs) involved were highly qualified. Sound and defensible 
judgment was used in the assumptions and application of chosen analytical methods. For the 
range of applicability of SAFER 2.1, the physical science results are reasonable and the possible 
uncertainty addressed. 
 
Areas for Improvement: SAFER 2.1 is currently under further development for significantly 
closer ranges of application than assumed for the original science algorithms. These algorithms 
will require detailed review and modification to assure applicability at the expected close-in 
distances for newer code versions. Basis of science development (structural algorithms) can be 
better documented to improve understanding of basic assumptions and judgments. Sensitivity 
studies would be beneficial in the continued refinement of uncertainty. Debris modeling is largely 
derived from empirical data and will continue to benefit from additional data. Refinement in air 
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blast for terrain and atmospheric effects for consequences of large events would be beneficial in 
the future. 
 
2. Does SAFER adequately address the probability of event?  
 
Findings:  The SAFER 2.1 code that deals with the probability of an event is a table lookup 
function.  The “bins” in the probability event table were based on existing data over a 10-year 
period of similar events.  The newer SAFER 3 code will add 5 years of explosive event data for a 
total of 15 years of historical explosive accident event data.  The “bins” were formed with a team 
of experts who reviewed the historical accident data.  This is a reasonable approach to 
determining the probability of an event. 
 
Areas for Improvement:  It is recommended that parametric sensitivity studies be performed 
that bound the degree of uncertainty of each area.  Those uncertainty results should then be used 
to determine a balanced development effort for each parameter including probability of event 
(Events), probability of effects given an event (Effects), and probability of a fatality given and 
event and effect (Exposures). 
 
3. Does SAFER adequately address and implement statistical science models in aggregating the 
risks, developing expected values, and estimating the uncertainty? 
 
Findings:  From our review of APT Research Inc. (APT) efforts to implement the proposed 
uncertainty guidance, it is our opinion that APT is doing a very credible job in implementing the 
uncertainty calculations as proposed by the previous Peer Review Team.  The culmination of this 
new method for addressing uncertainty will become available when SAFER 3.0 is released.  
There have already been substantial improvements made in SAFER 2.1 that address uncertainty. 
 
Areas for Improvement:  APT will have adequately addressed all of the uncertainty concerns by 
the previous Peer Review Team when SAFER 3 is released.  APT will add analysis within 
SAFER 3 that adequately addresses the aleatory and epistemic mechanisms to cover and treat 
risks. 
 
4. Is SAFER supporting documentation adequate for the user? 
 
Findings: The Peer Review Team reviewed key user documentation. Technical Paper 14 and the 
SAFER 2.1 user’s guide were reviewed and the typical user training received. Technical Paper 14 
is well laid out and addresses all elements of the application of the method. The user’s guide is in 
general well developed and linked to the training. Instructors for the training were key members 
of the APT staff with strong knowledge of the development of SAFER. 
 
Areas for Improvement:  The ability to trace the primary science in Technical Paper 14 and the 
user’s guide could be improved. Technical memorandums are the next level of documentation 
and in general can benefit from a more complete and consistent capture of underlying 
assumptions and limitations. Likewise, the user’s guide can be further developed to clarify 
application. 
 
5. Are the risk-based site plan process and criteria for Service and DDESB review and approval 
appropriate? 
 
Findings:  The risk-based site plan process and criteria for Service and DDESB review process 
were presented as part of the user training. The material presented was brief and generally at a top 
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level. The opinion of the reviewers is that, based on the developmental nature of the process and 
the lack of existing precedent, the level of review and approval is justified. 
 
Areas for Improvement:  The end-user would benefit from a detailed example and/or submittal 
“template” provided as part of the user training and appended to the user’s guide. 
 
6. Are the risk-based site plan process and criteria for Services and DDESB review and approval 
appropriately and clearly supported by DDESB policy?   
 
Findings:  The incremental nature of the implementation of risk-based method and current 
DDESB policy may slow the application and increase end-user frustration and confusion. 
 
Areas for Improvement:  More complete and definitive policy demonstrating the future 
commitment to the method will improve implementation. 
 
7. Is the current approach to program management and cost schedule control adequate for the 
continued development and implementation of SAFER? 
 
Findings:  The Product Development Team (PDT) approach used by the RBESCT has been very 
successful in achieving a common vision among stakeholders and developers. It is sometimes 
difficult for the PDT approach to management to clearly frame requirements and measure 
progress. 
 
Areas for Improvement:  We suggest some refinements of management to improve definition of 
requirements and allocation of resources planned and expended. The RBESCT would further 
benefit from central contract management and consolidation of multiple funding streams. 
1.2 Conclusion 
The DDESB through RBESCT has made significant progress in the development of a methodology for 
the rational implementation of risk-based explosives safety in the DoD. SAFER 2.1 is a well designed 
tool with capability for future modular improvement.  Implementation of the proposed six-year plan will 
allow significant progress and benefits in explosives safety modeling using SAFER. The Peer Review 
Team has seen no “show stopper” issues. Rather, continued commitment to development and 
implementation over time will determine rate of progress.  
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2 Introduction 
This report discusses the results of an independent peer review of the development and implementation 
progress of Safety Assessment for Explosive Risk (SAFER) Version 2.1. The SAFER model calculates 
risk in terms of the statistical expectation for loss of life from an explosives event.  Three components are 
multiplied to estimate annual maximum probability of fatality (Pf) and the expected fatalities (Ef): (1) the 
probability of an explosives event (Pe), (2) the probability of a fatality given an event (Pf/e), and (3) the 
expected exposure of an individual (Ei). SAFER calculates personnel risk using the following equations: 
 
 Pf = Pe * Pf/e * Ei  to determine individual risk 
 
 Ef = Σ(Pe * Pf/e * Ei)  to determine group risk. 
 
The review attempts to document a snapshot at this point in time of the maturity and consistency in level 
of development of key SAFER processes. It also suggests areas for consideration that will improve future 
independent efforts to benchmark the progress and credibility of the model and its implementation.  
3 Scope  
3.1 Background 
The Department of Defense (DoD) Explosives Safety Board (DDESB) has coordinated the development 
of a model, SAFER, to address the risk associated with the full range of ammunition and explosives 
operations. Quantity-distance (Q-D) criteria that address the consequences of an accidental explosion or 
deflagration of ammunition and explosives (but do not quantify the risks) have been used in making 
safety judgments for 90 years. For the last 30 years, it has been recognized that Q-D (which considers 
only the explosives quantity, hazard class, and types of structures (to some extent) to determine a safe 
separation distance) could be improved upon by including other considerations such as the type of 
activity, number of people, building construction, and environment to assess the overall risk of the 
operation.  Also, when Q-D standards cannot be met but there is a compelling reason for explosives 
storage or operations, there has not been a generally understood and accepted quantitative methodology 
for assessing the associated risks.  Similarly, there has been no standard methodology for comparing risks 
of alternative layouts, whether or not Q-D standards can be met.  
 
In 1997, the DDESB established the Risk Based Explosives Safety Criteria Team (RBESCT) to develop 
the risk-based approach for DoD to manage explosives siting.  This approach has been computerized in 
the SAFER model, and it is now approved with supporting policy for use on a trial basis within DoD in 
assessing the risk associated with hazardous operations and storage of DoD ammunition and explosives. 
3.2 Charter of the Peer Review 
The charter of the Peer Review Team is to provide an independent assessment of the components of the 
SAFER model, the ongoing development of the model and the risk assessment process and criteria.  This 
comprehensive peer review should address procedures, protocols, physical science algorithms, statistical 
science algorithms, software (SAFER 2), related documents and quality assurance, validation and 
verification. The peer review will also review the status of open actions from the previous Defense Threat 
Reduction Agency (DTRA) peer review.  The peer reviewers are not restricted from offering 
observations or findings outside the overall objective if it may benefit overall program development. The 
review will also consider the program management goal of “Transparency, Clarity, Consistency, and 
Reasonableness” (TCCR). 
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The following questions will be addressed. 
 
• Does SAFER adequately address and implement physical science models for the explosion 
effects and consequences for both personnel and structures? 
 
• Does SAFER adequately address the probability of event?   
 
• Does SAFER adequately address and implement statistical science models in aggregating the 
risks, developing expected values, and estimating the uncertainty? 
 
• Is SAFER supporting documentation adequate for the user? 
 
• Are the risk-based site plan process and criteria for Service and DDESB review and approval 
appropriate? 
• Does the risk-based site plan process and criteria for Services and DDESB review and approval 
appropriate and clearly supported by DDESB Policy? 
 
• Is the current approach to Program Management adequate for the continued development and 
implementation of SAFER? 
 
The reviewers are not restricted from offering observations or findings outside the scope of the preceding 
questions.  A final report of all finding and recommendations is expected at the end of the study.  
4 Assessment of SAFER Code 
4.1 Technical 
When considered in the aggregate of what is trying to be accomplished with this code, the three major 
parameters are: 
 
1. Probability of an event (Events) 
2. Probability of effects given an event (Effects) 
3. Probability of a fatality given and event and effect (Exposures) 
 
SAFER uses two equations that are basically originated from this equation 1: 
 
ExposureesConsequencLikelihoodRisk ∗∗=  (1) 
 
SAFER uses this formulation to calculate the product of three components to estimate the annual 
probability of fatality, Pf, as shown in the following equation:  
 
iefef EPPPRisk ∗∗==  (2) 
 
The Pe is defined as the probability that an explosives event will occur per potential explosion site (PES) 
per year. The Pf|e is defined as the probability of fatality given an explosives event and the presence of a 
person. Ei is defined as the exposure of one person to a particular PES on an annual basis. 
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A second measure associated with group risk is expected fatalities, Ef. This is defined as the summation of 
individual risks and provides expectancy or expected value (i.e., the average number of fatalities expected 
per year) as shown: 
∑ ∗∗=
n
iefef EPPE )(  (3) 
 
It appears that the major development and work in terms of details of the SAFER code is in parameter 2.  
One might consider making the argument that detailed calculations of parameter 1 and 3 are lacking when 
compared to parameter 2.  It is recommended that parametric sensitivity studies be performed that bound 
the degree of uncertainty of each area and those results be used to determine a balanced development 
effort for each parameter.   
4.1.1 Probability of Event and Exposure 
The first term of the risk equation is the probability of event, Pe.  This term is used to assess the likelihood 
that an explosives event occurs.  To incorporate the Pe into SAFER, a Pe matrix was developed using a 
compilation of historical explosives accident data from the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force. 
 
The Pe is a function of three parameters: 
 
1. Activity at the PES (activity type) 
2. Storage and transportation compatibility group (CG) 
3. Scaling factors 
 
The section of the SAFER 2.1 code that deals with the probability of an event might be characterized as a 
table lookup function.  The “bins” in the probability event table were based on existing data that existed 
over a 10-year period of similar events.  The newer SAFER 3 code will add five years of event data for a 
total of 15 years of historical explosive accident event data.  The “bins” were formed with a team of 
experts who reviewed the historical accident data.  This is a reasonable approach to determining the 
probability of an event. 
 
4.1.2 Probability of Effects Given an Event 
Historical implementation of explosives Q-D regulations based on empirical observations of accident 
results and test results provided only limited insight into the consequence of events. Implementation of a 
fast running software tool such as SAFER that quickly provides standardized, risk and consequence 
information to decision makers represents a significant advance in the DoD management of explosives 
safety. Credible and defensible physical science algorithms are critical to providing the decision makers 
with the best possible estimates of consequences of an explosive incidence at a given site.  It is equally 
important that this science demonstrate, from a legal and regulatory perspective, reasonable standards of 
care and address public perception. Physical science effects to be considered include: 
• Air blast  
• Thermal  
• Fragmentation and debris 
• Building damage 
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4.1.2.1 Air Blast  
The air blast parameters’ (pressure and impulse) values utilized by SAFER are estimated using Kingery-
Bulmash equations. These algorithms have been validated and refined through more than 30 years of 
application and supporting test data. The principal technical experts supporting SAFER in the application 
of air blast algorithms are Mr. Michael Swisdak, Swisdak, Naval Surface Warfare Center, Indian Head 
Division, and Dr. Jerry Ward.  Both are respected worldwide for their expertise in this field.  Over the last 
20 years, they have participated in DoD, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and other 
international committees and supported numerous blast effects test programs.  This has provided access to 
a large body of experimental data used to validate and refine simplified versions of the original Kingery-
Bulmash equations. These updated algorithms have been incorporated in the current version of the Blast 
Effects Computer (BEC) developed by Mr. Swisdak and Dr. Ward for the DDESB. The BEC is used as 
the routine within SAFER to extract air blast data for subsequent human injury, structural damage and 
debris and analysis.  The algorithms within the BEC provide the modifications of pressure and impulse 
for TNT equivalence and for weapon casing when present.  The selected cased weapons have been 
validated through testing as “worst case” munitions in terms of fragmentation and are conservatively used 
to represent cased items with less severe effects. The BEC also provides pressure and impulse attenuation 
algorithms for a family of the most commonly used ammunition and explosive PES structures within the 
DoD.  These attenuation modifications are derived from analysis of test data.  The approach is well 
founded in extensive experimental data. It is important to understand that the air blast algorithms as 
utilized in the BEC are based on the assumed environmental condition of blast wave reflection and 
expansion over a plane surface in a uniform standard atmosphere. It should be noted that in the U.S and 
worldwide these boundary conditions are assumed and used in the application of all existing Q-D 
standards. Under these conditions, the degree of uncertainty in air blast parameter prediction is small (a 
few percent). This limitation is recognized within the air blast science community but not so well by 
others in the safety and management areas.  It can contribute to significant variation in the air blast 
loading from actual large explosions, such as those noted after the PEPCON accident in Henderson, 
Nevada, in 1988. 
4.1.2.2 Thermal 
Since SAFER “is designed to evaluate risks at large distances from the PES,” thermal effects are likely 
included for completeness of the total method.  Thermal effects are calculated by a quantity-distance 
factor and are used for Hazard Division (HD) 1.3 explosives (mass fire, bulk propellant).  This factor is 
adjusted for the Exposed Site (ES) building type and the number of windows in the structure.  Since the 
probability of fatality due to thermal effects are most likely to be low compared to blast or fragmentation 
in a major event at most distances, the approach used seems more than adequate.  Only if a scenario is 
found in which a thermal effect is of dominant importance would refinement of the computational method 
be needed (for instance, mass storage of weapons designed to utilize thermal effects). There appear to be 
no current plans of development in this area for future versions of SAFER.  Thermal codes are available 
elsewhere and could be utilized for improved calculations. 
4.1.2.3 Fragmentation and Debris 
The creation of debris—primary steel fragments from explosive items, secondary chunks of concrete from 
the PES and ejecta from the ground— is a complex process the results of which are best characterized by 
statistics.  Technical Paper 16, “Methodologies for Calculating Primary Fragment Characteristics,” gives 
a thorough description of the standard methods (Gurney and Mott) used for estimating fragment 
distributions (mass and velocities) from naturally fragmenting bombs or warheads (with some discussion 
of preformed fragments).  These methods are supported by experimental results.  Extension of these 
methods to multiple (stacks) of munitions is discussed.  Validation and improvement of the extension 
methods to multiple items will benefit from test programs.  
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The implementation of the methods for estimating primary fragment distributions in SAFER is to 
characterize a growing number of available weapon types by distribution described by bins of initial 
kinetic energies and maximum throw distances (essentially initial velocities).  For a naturally fragmenting 
bomb or warhead, the fragments produced not only vary in mass and velocity, and therefore kinetic 
energy, but also in shape.  Fragment shape affects the efficiency of flight through the air and penetration 
of barriers.  These variations will cause scatter in test results.  However, inevitable deviation of test results 
from the fairly straightforward SAFER calculations should be covered by the evolving uncertainty 
computations. 
 
Fragment distributions from single bombs and warheads are characterized by mass, velocity and polar 
angle; so there is an orientation component.  It might be expected that total debris from neatly stacked 
munitions might also have such a component.  It might also be possible that the general direction of 
debris could depend on the location of the original donor to an event.  Orientation of the PES to the ES is 
a part of the SAFER input. The “cloverleaf debris pattern” task has an improvement priority number of 7 
(SAFER 3+).  This is an area that may need to be revisited if any test data is found or developed. 
 
The three improvement tasks for SAFER 3 with the highest priority or lowest level of difficultly 
concerning debris are:  1) the high-angle/low-angle split task; 2) the close-in, fly-through debris task; and 
3) the crater ejecta issue task.  In addition, a field storage (iso-container) PES option is reported as 
completed and ready for inclusion in SAFER.  The debris issues raised in the review of SAFER 1 
concerning the assumption of simultaneous detonation (step 4) and containment (step 12) have been 
designated as closed due to low probability of a scenario and consideration promised at a later date.   
Other debris issues appear to have been successfully resolved.  Generally, any validating data that can be 
afforded would be valuable and should be documented. 
4.1.2.4 Building and Glass Damage 
The analysis of structural response and consequently building damage is required to estimate serious 
injuries and fatalities resulting from air blast from explosions. Significant uncertainties exist not only in 
the air blast propagation but also in the resulting loading of a particular structure and finally in predicting 
the structure’s dynamic response. As the load exceeds the structure’s design capacity, deformation, debris 
and finally collapse lead to risks to building occupants. The expertise and judgment of the analysts in 
modeling these types of phenomena are extremely important in limiting uncertainty. The building damage 
model development team includes Mr. Jim Tancreto of the Naval Facilities Engineering Service 
Command (NFESC), Jon Chrostowski and Wenshui Gan of ACTA, Paul Wilde (formerly of ACTA and 
now of the Federal Aviation Administration) and David Begosian of Karagosian and Case. All of the 
team members are extremely knowledgeable engineers/analysts with extensive backgrounds in this field. 
They have been involved in similar ongoing work with the Air Force Range Commanders, NFESC, and 
DTRA.  Analytical modeling by this team is expected to be highly credible if properly translated in the 
code development process. As discussed in the supporting documentation, three different approaches 
have historically been used to estimate building damage from air blast load and debris: 
 
Level 1 Methods – Damage is related strictly to blast intensity (overpressure) without regard to duration 
based on observation of accident data or testing. This approach was common prior to the availability of 
fast running structural analysis codes.  Most structural damage data from the 1940s through the 1970s was 
documented in this form. Little physics-based analysis was attempted to relate this data to injury or 
fatalities. Level 1 Methods were not utilized in SAFER 2.1 except as a means to validate other analysis or 
supplement expert opinion where analytical methods are limited. 
 
Level 2 Methods – Recognize that structural response to air blast is dynamic and relates to both pressure 
and impulse (duration of the blast load). This approach is computationally intensive and requires use of 
appropriate computer codes and a knowledgeable analyst. Structural damage and glass breakage are based 
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on simplified physics-based models that estimate response to both pressure and impulse. The analyst must 
develop criteria that can be used to relate structure response to level of building damage. From this point, 
injuries and fatalities of building occupants are related to the level of building damage and/or glass 
breakage.  The translation of the resulting damage to injury or fatality requires expert judgment and 
grounding to actual data and has a much higher degree of uncertainty. Level 2 modeling is the basis for 
most of the structural damage algorithms in SAFER 2.1  
 
Level 3 Methods - Structural damage or glass breakage is based on detailed models that estimate the 
dynamic response of structural elements and window components (e.g., time histories of deflection, 
stress, nonlinear behavior). After structural or glass failure, impulse-related debris models are used to 
track flying glass shards and/or wall and roof debris falling into the building. Human vulnerability models 
(for both blunt and penetrating objects) are then used to determine the probability of serious injury and/or 
fatality to occupants as a function of the mass and velocity of wall/roof debris and flying glass shards. 
This approach provides the most analytically complete approach but is computationally intensive and 
requires significant biomedical modeling with its additional uncertainty.  Level 3 modeling has been 
utilized in the development of the glass damage algorithms 
 
Building Damage. The SAFER 2.1 structure modeling strategy is derived from pressure-impulse (P-I) 
model methods. P-I models are considered to be Level 2 models.  This approach has been used for 
structural response to air blast loading for many years and is widely accepted as a technique to simplify 
damage estimation. Depending on the degree of fidelity and validation with Level 3 models, they can be a 
suitable means to provide fast results over defined ranges of loading and response. The SAFER 2.1 P-I 
models were derived from an existing damage model “Facility and Component Explosive Damage 
Assessment Program” (FACEDAP), developed by the Corps of Engineers (1994). To simplify structural 
model development effort, as well as coding effort and complexity of user input, SAFER 2.1 utilizes a 
limited number of building structural configurations (15 buildings, 1 vehicle). In addition, the P-I 
response curves of these structures have been simplified from the FACEDAP approach which required 
development of many detailed elements of the building structure. In SAFER 2.1, multiple FACEDAP 
components were aggregated to whole wall and roof elements and subjected to many loadings oriented 
around and at varying distances from the structure.   Then the damage for the wall facing reflected 
pressure and impulse, and all other walls loadings are averaged to develop a single P-I curve that 
represents the entire building. The damage criteria for SAFER P-I components are the same as 
FACEDAP and have been found to be generally conservative.   Understanding limitations and uncertainty 
of this single value “smeared average” damage P-I curve is important.  Because of the number of 
components summed in the models, an “average”  P-I damage of 20% in SAFER may mean a damage 
level on the wall facing the explosion of 40%, while other walls may see less than 10%. The model 
“average” damage curves are then indexed to the incident pressure and impulse from the BEC model. 
This approach allows the siting of ES buildings by end-users to be based solely on distance from the PES, 
with no requirement to orient the exposed structure for a reflected loading.  In addition, use of standard 
building sizes limits the requirement for users to develop extensive building structural information. The 
resulting single-value damage fraction is then related to the likelihood of injury through comparison with 
available data from explosive events, other models and the judgment of the analytical team. The ratio of 
fatalities-to-injuries likewise considers accident data and judgment.  The analytical team attempted to 
validate the casualty and fatality relationships with numerous available explosive incidents and test 
program data for conventional explosions, nuclear tests and another advanced building damage code 
(ERASDAC). Results correlate reasonably well.  SAFER coding then transforms the fatality estimates to 
a lognormal distribution to derive the final building fatality estimate.  It is uncertain why the lognormal 
transformation is used, and it would appear to add another factor of uncertainty to the results.  The 
reviewer was unable to determine if the overall degree of uncertainty associated with these simplified 
methods has been quantified or documented.  The RBESCT may have judged that, for the relatively 
modest structure damage levels expected at the ranges under consideration in SAFER 2.1 (Public Traffic 
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Rout (PTR) and beyond), these uncertainties were small compared to uncertainties in other branches of 
the SAFER code.  
 
Glass Breakage.  Risk and consequences from glass breakage are known to be significant to distances in 
excess of twice current inhabited building distance standards. Based on substantial glass modeling by 
ACTA and to simplify and limit model complexity, end-user input and data collection workload, injury 
and fatality P-I diagrams were developed for nine representative window types (three sizes each of 
annealed, dual pane and tempered glazing) and for the passenger vehicle.  Level 3 (physics-based) 
modeling techniques were used to develop the glass breakage, serious injury and fatality P-I diagrams. 
The Level 3 glass modeling is a very comprehensive approach.  The analysis computes the response, 
breakage, trajectory and consequences of blast loading on the windows. It computes the response of the 
window using a single degree-of-freedom, nonlinear resistance function and accounts for uncertainty in 
critical input parameters using Monte Carlo method of underlying material properties. The response is 
compared against the strength of the window to determine breakage limits. The fragment size distribution 
is determined as well as the initial velocity profile across the window area. The trajectory of the shards 
thrown into the room is determined as well as whether the shards will impact a person within a defined 
exposure area.  The final P-I diagrams do not represent the probability of breakage, serious injury and 
fatality of a single window pane, but rather the consequences averaged over all windows (front, side and 
rear) of a generic building configuration.  This “averaging” approach requires the same cautionary 
awareness as mentioned earlier for averaging of structural P-I curves. The windows on the wall facing the 
event and subject to reflected pressure and impulse may give results substantially worse than the 
“average.” The results of the window model can be adjusted through a simple scaling method to represent 
other smaller or larger buildings with more or less window area.  A substantial effort was expended by 
ACTA to validate the glass modeling.  Validation consisted of comparisons to test data and other model 
results.  Historical evidence from accidental, experimental and other events was compared with modeling 
results. In addition, expert opinion surveys were also used.  The effort in the development and validation 
of the glass model has been thorough and highly credible.  However, it is expected that substantial 
additional data and refinement of methodologies from many government agencies as well as industry will 
occur in the next few years. This technology development should be tracked closely to integrate 
appropriate improvements. 
4.1.3 Probability of a Fatality Given an Event and Effect 
The probability of fatality given an event and effect is one of the most difficult parameters to develop. As 
mentioned previously, the correlation of fatalities to structural damage is largely based on empirical ratios 
of fatalities to injuries taken from observed events with similar building damage. Because the SAFER 
building damage is largely Level 2-based analyses, the development of these ratios is more subjective and 
uncertain than for the Level 3 methods (which still have a notable degree of uncertainty) utilized for the 
glass modeling. Increased use of Level 3 methods for structural damage prediction can refine the 
prediction of injuries and fatalities and result in physics consistent with the glass model methodology. It is 
understood that more-advanced Level 3 modeling of building damage and related injury and fatality is 
ongoing with other agencies. Efforts should be made to take advantage of this work to continue to 
improve the confidence in the model and reduce areas of uncertainty. However, given the use of single- 
point P-I damage index, there will still be a great deal of uncertainty in fatality estimation. Some 
parametric sensitivity studies would be valuable in quantifying these issues. Accurate fatality distribution 
for closer-scaled ranges contemplated in SAFER 3 and beyond will likely require models capable of 
addressing orientation and localized variation in ES building damage. 
 
A summit with the NATO organizations was conducted for modeling assessment of explosives codes to 
compare model results from a common problem.  The results presented to the Peer Review Team of this 
summit indicated that the SAFER code was provided more detailed analysis capabilities in almost every 
case.  Similar results were obtained from all the models to the extent possible. 
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The annual exposure versus sequential operations needs some more attention.  Migrating away from 
expert opinions to a more rigorous analysis is probably required in both the probability of an event and 
the association of fatalities.  Some thought should be given to this area, and an improved normalization of 
risk calculation should be performed.  For instance, the probability of an event might be correlated to the 
presence of workers and even to the number of workers. so that an hourly probability of an event is not 
the yearly probability divided by the number of hours in a year. 
4.1.4 Uncertainty 
The previous Peer Review Team was heavily involved in providing detailed guidance on how to add and 
calculate the uncertainty associated with SAFER detailed calculations.  From our review of APT's efforts 
to implement the proposed uncertainty guidance, it is our opinion that APT is doing a very credible job in 
implementing the uncertainty calculations as proposed by the previous Peer Review Team.  The 
culmination of this new method for addressing uncertainty will become available when SAFER 3.0 is 
released.  There have already been substantial improvements made in SAFER 2.1 that address 
uncertainty.  Currently, the uncertainty tree includes three major terms at the top and a total of 11 factors 
for the final calculation, with most of the detail in the effects part of the tree.  
 
Given the current design of SAFER, the method by which APT is implementing these uncertainty 
calculations is adequate.  In a more general way, one would expect uncertainty to be calculated using 
some form of multiple simulations (Monte Carlo) with random draws taken from distributions of the 
parameters involved in SAFER.  To implement such a method would require a major restructuring of the 
SAFER architecture, and this Peer Review Team does not see the benefits that would be derived as 
necessary. 
 
In SAFER 2.1, uncertainty is calculated outside of the basic model and does not have any affect on the 
average value.  Correlations are not fully treated in SAFER 2.1  There is a post processing of data 
performed using the uncertainty tree to aggregate the risk. 
 
In the SAFER 3 design, APT has built uncertainty calculations into the code that do affect the average 
value of risk.  This work is based on cooperative efforts with DTRA Subject Matter Experts (SMEs), and 
the result defined in Dr. R.W. Mensing’s paper dated 4 Nov 03.  Correlations will be fully treated in 
SAFER 3.  We believe that APT will have adequately addressed all of the uncertainty concerns addressed 
by the previous Peer Review Team when SAFER 3 is released. APT will add analysis within SAFER 3 
that adequately covers the aleatory and epistemic mechanisms to cover and treat risks. 
4.1.5 User Interface 
In general, the user interface and amount of input data required by the user are very well done.  There are 
a few places and terminology that we believe could be improved.  A few minor title changes might be 
appropriate (e.g., “Scaling factors” might be changed to “Environmental factors”).  It would seem that the 
input screens might be made more similar to the “User Settings for PES” screen to help the user better 
understand the inputs and the outputs.  The outputs shown in the “User Settings for PES” screen are 
clearer for understanding the user inputs.  Maybe the input screens can be constructed into categories 
similar to the output screens. 
 
The outputs are definitely oriented toward a scientist, with notation as follows:  1.8e-10.  Maybe one 
could provide a toggle capability between scientific and decimal notations.  We realize this may be 
impractical when there are large (>10) exponents involved. 
 
It would be more consistent if a descriptive message would appear to inform a new user that “D” is the 
default when the default “unknown” choice of compatibility group is selected.  It might also be useful and 
 - 19 - 
  
re-assuring to a new user familiar with Q-D if a safe distance value based on the old method could be 
included in the PES printout at the end of input. 
4.1.6 Limitations 
4.1.6.1 Protocol – Steps – Sequential 
A protocol was defined and shown using SAFER in an evaluation of the Blount Island site. The protocol 
was basically a set of steps/locations that the SAFER analysis performed.  An individual SAFER analysis 
was performed to account for transportation, loading, unloading, storage, etc.  This approach was very 
elementary and needs to be automated in some fashion.  The basic methodology (protocol) was shown for 
the Blount Island analysis.  It is our belief that scenarios and the modeling of these scenarios (probably 
using simulation) is required for modeling and performing analysis of different scenarios/protocols.   
There should be a way to specify the scenario in detail.  SAFER code needs to roll up and simulate (run) 
the code to assess a complete base with multiple scenarios. 
4.1.6.2 Applications 
The risk-and-consequence analysis capabilities of SAFER provide a significant advance within the DoD 
for explosives safety management and siting. In addition, SAFER would have valuable application for 
installation and facility master planning, military construction (MILCON) programming and overall 
command visibility and readiness.  The concept of TCCR is critical to the successful implementation and 
application of risk-based methods and SAFER.  Risk-based methods are widely used by other government 
agencies in many forms.  Risk-based decisions that have created public risk or the perception of such risk 
have been challenged by the public with competing approaches.  As the risk-based methods in SAFER are 
more widely implemented, the underlying methods and algorithms will come under more scrutiny, 
including possible legal challenge.  SAFER 2.1, as reviewed, has significant capability but at the same 
time is a work in progress, with many limitations to be addressed as planned in the RBESCT six-year 
plan.  As each version of SAFER is implemented, the version of SAFER code in use, the training of end- 
users and some form of concise documentation should be maintained that captures the capability and 
limitations of the version. This would include source algorithm maturity, uncertainty and any future 
activity to improve or refine it.  The released and approved version of SAFER should be coded to prevent 
users from entering input inconsistent with the limitations of the underlying algorithms. Some science 
limitations which could be made more visible are listed in Section 4, Improvements. While the current 
science limitations are addressed by the uncertainty bounding in SAFER 2.1, it is noted that nearly all of 
the uncertainty upper bound estimates are from “expert elicitation.”  Expert elicitation is often challenged; 
and the long-range desire should be to better quantify these factors with some type of improved analytical 
method, sensitivity study or testing. Acknowledging and addressing these concerns are consistent with the 
goal of TCCR. 
 
The RBESCT is complimented on the amount of effort it has expended in attempting to document the 
development of SAFER. In reviewing this extensive library, many of the issues raised during this review 
along with apparent courses of action have been surfaced by the RBESCT at different times.  As 
development progresses, it is believed that a more concise history of each underlying methodology, 
algorithm, or placeholder would be greatly beneficial to increasing the TCCR objective and to expedite 
and improve the ease of any future reviews.  It appears that the technical memorandum process is a 
suitable mechanism for this purpose.  However, the content of the current versions of these memoranda 
are not in a format nor do they include all of the content necessary to track the development, assumptions, 
uncertainties and future improvement goals. 
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4.1.7 Inputs/Outputs/Design 
The basic design of SAFER is adequate for what the code has been designed to address.  Minor 
improvements in terminology could be made to the existing input screens and have been suggested above.  
The outputs seem to be well organized and presented correctly.  The calculations and design within 
SAFER are very efficient.  We applaud the SAFER design team with a job well done in keeping the 
inputs simplified and the outputs well organized.  The detailed physics calculations appear to be well 
thought-through and provide meaningful results.  The SAFER design somewhat limits the ability to wrap 
a simulation around SAFER to address multiple evaluation points (protocols) and perform random draws 
from distribution of parameters for calculations of uncertainty.  The previous peer review team 
recommended a Monte Carlo approach.  SAFER 3 uses an analytical based model formulated by a 
previous peer reviewer for uncertainty that replaced the Monte Carlo method. 
 
A scenario capability (protocol) method needs to be developed to allow the user to describe a base storage 
for explosives and movement of explosives into and out of storage.  In addition, the capability to address 
different environmental conditions (wind, rain, humidity, etc.) and their effects on the SAFER 
calculations should be considered.  Conceptually, multiple runs of SAFER would need to be encapsulated 
for covering a complete scenario or set of scenarios (protocols) for a base analysis.  Ideally, the user 
should be able to describe the scenario or set of scenarios; and the complete analysis would be performed 
by SAFER and summary results presented for each major area of concern. 
4.1.8 Certification/Validation/Verification/Commercialization 
The SAFER code would seem to have applications for base evaluations in support of programs like 
Guardian (which is directed at evaluation of chemical, biological, nuclear, and radiological threats on all 
of the government facilities in the U.S. and overseas).  From a government point of view, there seems to 
be an oversight by the DDESB on moving toward a formal certification of the SAFER code.  This would 
include the need for software validation and verification (V&V) of the SAFER code.  The Peer Review 
Team highly recommends that it is time to formally approve the SAFER code for appropriate explosives 
risk evaluations.  What we are suggesting is that it is time to take the next step in a formal process to 
properly certify the SAFER code.  It appears to us that SAFER can easily meet all of the requirements of 
a formal V&V review and approval.  It is our belief that the SAFER code deserves and should be formally 
certified for government use. 
 
The other related area is commercialization.  The Peer Review Team did not see or hear of any plan to 
commercialize the SAFER code.  We believe that commercialization of SAFER should be considered and 
a plan developed with a schedule to move toward this objective.  Consideration of potential users and 
demand for SAFER both in the U.S. and NATO communities should be considered as part of this process. 
4.2 Management 
4.2.1 Software Management/Development 
The methodology used in the SAFER software development activities was very structured.  The controls 
associated with tracking changes and document library check-ins are an excellent method to manage 
software development.  
 
The SAFER documentation is excellent.  A number of detailed documents describing the SAFER code 
have been developed and provide an excellent foundation and resource of information.  In addition, a 
number of SAFER courses have been presented along with the detailed supporting documentation.  The 
SAFER code documentation provided to the Peer Review Team was outstanding. 
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4.2.2 Program Management 
4.2.2.1 APT  
APT has responded to customer needs in a very professional manner, with excellent and knowledgeable 
staff working on SAFER.  APT has demonstrated a high degree of commitment to the RBESCT and 
successful program management. In particular, the APT role in facilitating team building and consensus 
among DoD stakeholders has been an important factor in continued advancement of the risk-based 
methodology. On the administrative side, the multiple contract vehicles, piecemeal availability of funds, 
limited project task scheduling, and requirements creep all contributed to challenges in efficient 
performance of production work such as code development and validation. 
4.2.2.2 Government/Sponsors 
The government participation on the RBESCT has been notable in terms of the depth and breadth of 
knowledge of DoD explosives safety policy, regulation and explosive effects and structural response 
science.  The government science personnel have provided critical, long-term expertise that was 
successfully leveraged through contractor support. However, it appears the government contribution to 
the team likewise suffered by the nature of the funding stream, the “time and material” nature of the 
project planning and scheduling, and the difficulty in achieving a consistent contracting method. 
4.2.3 Vision for SAFER 
The RBESCT-proposed future development recommendations for Risk-Based Explosives Safety Methods 
and SAFER were reviewed as presented in the April 2003 Vision Paper.  A vision statement is normally a 
very brief and to-the-point summation of the expected future state of an organization, product, or service. 
For example, the vision statement for SAFER and risk-based methods might be as noted in the body of 
the paper as:  
 
“The ultimate goal is to have a suite of explosives safety risk assessment tools that is not only 
adopted by DoD but is recognized and accepted by the worldwide explosives safety community.” 
 
The vision paper contains this theme but also appears to be intended to be a short tutorial and background 
paper on the development and future of SAFER and a plan on how the future vision can be achieved.  
Two key areas for explosives safety have been identified. The first is associated with risk management 
and the second is associated with siting.  The goal for risk management is to increase safety by 
understanding and lowering risk.  This potential use is envisioned to have a wide application among 
safety personnel managing explosives risks. A significant benefit of this type of assessment is the insight 
into the driving factors of risk gained by the practicing safety personnel. These insights are often not 
intuitive and are not at all evident when applying the current Q-D method.  The goals for siting are to 
provide a high degree of safety to personnel and meet operational requirements in a consistent manner. 
The current Q-D approach to siting is acknowledged to be very limited in these key areas. 
 
The direction of the DDESB and the accomplishments of the RBESCT in the development of SAFER 
have addressed both of the areas above.  However, the reviewers believe that the application of risk 
management and siting using SAFER is going to be significantly more complex for safety personnel and 
management to apply and interpret. Key to implementation of the method is criteria acceptable to the 
stakeholders (DDESB, military Services, etc.). Development of implementing policy appears to be very 
cautious.  Initial criteria has been developed addressing the protection level for an individual (public or 
worker). These criteria form the foundation for a future complete set of criteria that would also provide 
protection for workers, and collective risks for groups.  Other measures, such as injury or asset damage 
and mission impact (consequence analysis), are expected to be in demand in the future.  Refinements of 
criteria are expected before the end of 2004, to include group risk criteria. 
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The modular design of SAFER provides a capability to easily tailor a version of SAFER for multiple 
uses.  SAFER can also provide a capability for explosives risk assessments for use by commanders in 
making peacetime, deployment, theater of operations, and other explosives safety and force protection 
decisions. It can be extended to address transportation, off-post hazards to the public, commercial 
facilities deployments, and transformation initiatives. SAFER has additional capability not noted by the 
vision paper in the area of facility and installation master planning and in MILCON programming. With 
some modification, it may also be valuable for unexploded ordnance cleanup, which could result in 
significant savings in program life-cycle remediation cost.  The reviewers believe that SAFER is maturing 
technically in a timely manner to meet the objective of the suggested vision statement.  Development of 
an implementing service policy, a precedent for liability, and public acceptance will all be controlling 
factors in the degree and rate of acceptance of the SAFER code.  
 
Efforts to initiate many of the other potential capabilities outlined in the vision statement have not begun 
and strategies to do so are not clear. These other applications are beyond the charter of the RBESCT and 
would require additional program management direction and funding. 
4.2.3.1 User 
The current vision for SAFER application is focused on the safety professional as the end-user.  There are 
many other possible users, as suggested above. An approach for including other users for applying 
SAFER would be useful. The training taken by the peer reviewers indicates that a higher level of safety 
training and knowledge than some of the end- users will have (i.e., “Airman Snuffy”) is required.  End-
users will need to develop experience (with some oversight) using the SAFER code before they can be 
expected to be independently competent.  Evolving policy and precedent in application will continue to be 
sources of problems and frustration for end-users.  
4.2.3.2 Standard Tool for DoD Explosives Safety Siting Work 
The vision statement and six-year plan indicate that the long-range goal is for SAFER to be the standard 
tool for all DoD explosives safety siting. The implementation plan and schedule to achieve this goal are 
not clear and appear to be uncertain at this time.  
4.2.3.3 There is Not a Clear and Binding Policy On How/When to Use SAFER 
Continued, expanded use of SAFER will depend on how soon DDESB and the Services develop clear and 
binding policy.  Based on the approval process presented in the SAFER 2.1 training, some observations 
are offered: 
• Application of the policy letter is difficult to translate into a detailed plan. 
• The approval process flow chart is excellent but at a high level. 
• Data requirements for a submittal are formidable and only described at the summary level without 
detail of an acceptable format and content. 
• A well structured template and associated example could be developed and provided in the user 
manual and utilized as a class example during training. 
     
4.3 Cost and Management 
The RBESCT appears to function as a Product Delivery Team.  This approach has allowed the team great 
flexibility, maximized cross-functional communications and increased consensus building among the 
stakeholders.  A great deal of productive work has been accomplished in this manner.  However, the 
generalized objectives and frequent changes that result from this approach appear to make it difficult to 
clearly define requirements, plan and allocate work performed against specific work items and the related 
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cost.  A substantial amount of effort has been expended in Activity 5 (Team support, Meeting/Panel 
preparation, attendance, minutes; Consensus building) as shown in Table 1 below.   
Table 1  SAFER Expenditures by Activity 
2003 2002 2001
1 Policy Development 20% 18% 15%
2 Scientific Algorithms 24% 24% 26%
3 Uncertainty Algorithms 18% 13% 6%
4 Software Development 15% 21% 37%
5
Team support; Meeting/Panel preparation, 
attendance, minutes; Consensus building 20% 21% 15%
6 Contract Administration 3% 2% 1%
% denotes percentage of funding spent on each activity.  
Calendar Year
Activities
 
 
It is not clear to an outside observer that this effort can be delineated from the production work such as 
software and science algorithm development and science testing.  A significant amount of funding has 
been expended over the last six years, and an equally large amount is planned for the next six.  As the 
program becomes more visible, it can be expected to receive more scrutiny for achievement versus 
expenditures.  We believe that Activity 5 needs to be more clearly defined versus the software and 
algorithms development activities.  It is believed that the program would benefit by a more structured 
approach to work planning, linked to the six-year plan and budgeted to specific work breakdown structure 
(WBS) elements.  A relatively simple project network breakdown to two or three levels would probably 
be adequate and would more clearly defend progress against funding.  It would also be beneficial to 
program management in justification of funding requests to fund providers.  A simple Network Analysis 
Schedule (NAS) tool such as Microsoft Project would be adequate.  It is understood that work 
requirements would change; and revision to the baseline WBS is easily accomplished, providing a 
valuable audit trail. 
4.3.1  Contract Management Approach 
The RBECT development of SAFER over the last six years has been accomplished through as many as 
five or more funding sources, which include the DDESB, Army, Navy, Marine Corp and Air Force. Each 
source apparently provides a separate fund cite through a variety of contracting tasks or mechanisms. This 
funding was managed as a time and materials (T&M) contract effort. This makes tracking of expenditures 
against activities difficult as well as limiting program management visibility on work progress.  It is not 
clear why all contributors could not provide direct funds to a single contracting office for management by 
a single contracting officer and contracting officer’s technical representative (COTR).  This, along with a 
resource-loaded NAS as suggested in the previous section, would greatly improve overall management 
and documentation of work performed. 
4.3.1.1 Requirements Definitions 
Activity 5 in Table 1 seems to be a separate activity from a normal software development project.  If this 
activity is necessary among the sponsoring organizations, then maybe it should be considered as a stand 
alone and separately funded project.  We believe the current approach for management of requirements 
has provided ill-defined requirements for APT and its software development team. 
4.3.1.2 The Product Development Team (PDT) 
The PDT approach utilized by the RBESCT has been very successful in developing a common vision, 
stakeholder buy-in and leveraging of the special skills and expertise of the government and the contractor. 
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The limitations on the PDT approach to management are typically in program management discipline and 
development of clear and measurable requirements. The review team has observed these same elements 
could be improved in future development efforts for SAFER.  Without clearly stated objectives, 
requirement creep is common. The historical evolution of SAFER requirements appears to reflect the 
“fuzzy” nature of the PDT approach to software development, science, uncertainty, risk, etc. 
5 Recommendations for Improvements 
5.1 Technical 
5.1.1 Probability of Event and Exposure 
The three major parameters within SAFER are: 
 
1. Probability of an event (Events) 
2. Probability of effects given an event (Effects) 
3. Probability of a fatality given and event and effect (Exposures) 
 
It appears that the major development and work in terms of details of the SAFER code are in parameter 2.  
Currently, the detail calculations of parameter 1 and 3 are lacking within SAFER when compared to depth 
of calculations of parameter 2.  It is recommended that parametric sensitivity studies be performed on the 
P(e) and exposure that bound the degree of uncertainty of each area and that those results be used to 
determine a balanced or appropriate development effort for each parameter.  
5.1.2 Probability of Effects Given an Event 
5.1.2.1 Air Blast 
The DDESB vision appears to be for SAFER to be the primary future tool for site plan assessment and 
risk management.  It can be expected that SAFER would be used for the siting of a range of explosive 
quantities, from relatively small (less than a hundred pounds of explosives) to very large quantities (up to 
5 million pounds of explosives).  For large detonations, local atmospheric conditions and terrain can 
significantly alter the predicted attenuation of air blast with distance. Factors that contribute include local 
wind variations, atmospheric focusing and terrain.  These variations have been recognized for large-scale 
explosive and nuclear test events and for missile and spacecraft ranges for launches.  However, they have 
been historically ignored for Q-D regulation of “static” storage or handling.  Long-term development of 
SAFER should consider when and how to address these variations for large-quantity situations.  For 
example, sensitivity of air blast contours to local wind rose variations by month might be accommodated 
as part of initial risk management activities for very large quantities.  Estimating air-blast modification 
from atmospheric variation and terrain is not considered for site plan approval but in the future might be 
addressed through parametric sensitivity studies of consequence analysis. For the near term, the RBESCT 
should begin to formulate criteria for such adjustments in parameters and consider suitable 
implementation methods and policy.  For approved versions of SAFER, it is recommended that 
limitations on applications in areas of rapidly varying terrain should be documented in user’s guides and 
incorporated in training. 
 
The empirical algorithm currently utilized to predict progressive damage and eventual destruction of the 
PES can be significantly affected by gas pressure, venting rates, volume, strength and proportions of the 
PES storage structure. These effects will be most noticeable for closer-in exposures (less than scaled 
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range of 9) and for PES quantities within an order of magnitude of the 100% destruction quantity. The 
uncertainty in this algorithm is not believed to be significant for PES explosive quantities significantly 
larger than the 100% destruct value at the scaled range of application of SAFER 2.1. For closer-scaled 
ranges, additional validation of the algorithm is suggested. 
5.1.2.2 Thermal 
Since the probability of fatality due to thermal effects is most likely to be low compared to blast or 
fragmentation in a major event at most distances, the approach currently used in SAFER seems more than 
adequate.  Only if a scenario is found in which a thermal effect is of dominant importance would 
refinement of the computational method be needed (for instance, mass storage of weapons designed to 
utilize thermal effects).  
5.1.2.3 Fragmentation and Debris 
Fragment distributions from single bombs and warheads are characterized by mass, velocity and polar 
angle; so there is an orientation component.  Orientation of the PES to the ES is a part of the SAFER 
input. The “cloverleaf debris pattern” task has a development improvement priority of 7 (SAFER 3+).  
This is an area that may need to be revisited if any test data is found or developed. 
 
Three of the improvement tasks for SAFER 3 with the highest priority or lowest levels of difficultly 
concern debris are:  1) the high-angle/low-angle split task; 2) the close-in, fly-through debris task; and 3) 
the crater ejecta issue task.  Generally, any validating data that can be afforded would be valuable and 
should be documented. 
5.1.2.4 Building and Glass Damage 
It is suggested that a parametric sensitivity study be performed to estimate the range of uncertainties in 
the simplified underlying structural response models.  In addition, the available structures may not be 
suitable to represent some classes of structures and may seriously underestimate the risk of collapse and 
casualties for low-pressure, high-impulse loading. Examples are gymnasiums, auditoriums and aircraft 
hangers.  Such structures are commonly found on DoD installations and often in nearby communities. 
These structures are sensitive to significant damage at scaled ranges of K80 or more. They also tend to 
have the potential for high concentrations of occupants and significant consequences given an event. The 
use of a single P-I index for a structure also has limitations for lower charge weights. When the span of a 
structure becomes a significant percentage of the range, the P-I damage index from the front face to the 
rear may vary by three orders of magnitude. It appears that for structure dimensions less than 10% of the 
range, the variation is acceptable. A sensitivity study could resolve the range of variation for damage and 
resulting Pf/e. For other situations where the loading gradient across the structure is significant (scaled 
ranges << 24), structure orientation and damage/injury/fatality specific to reflected wall, sidewall and rear 
wall should be considered. 
 
The SAFER 2.1 segregation of structures into square feet groups (<5000, 5000<20,000, >20,000) is not 
consistent with the development of the structural models in Appendix G of the user’s guide (2500, 
10,000, 40,000). This brings into question the fidelity with regard to the underlying assumptions used by 
ACTA in model development. No explanation could be found to clarify the reason for the change or the 
associated uncertainty. 
 
The description of the structure types in Appendix G, SAFER User Manual, is sparse and does not make 
clear the underlying assumptions/limitations with the simplified models. For example, many building 
types do not identify roof support assumptions (i.e., interior columns or walls and associated span lengths 
or damage criteria for P-I development). It is suggested that Appendix G be revised to provide a much 
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more detailed background on the structure types and the limitations within the context of the SAFER 
software evolution. 
 
The development and modification of science algorithms within SAFER are clearly an ongoing process.  
SAFER 3.0 is already well under way and will extend the range and application of the tool to much closer 
ranges.  Many of the algorithms which were judged to be reasonable for SAFER 2.1 have a great deal 
more uncertainty for scaled ranges much closer than K18.  It is believed by the review team that more 
verification is required to confirm the extension of the SAFER 2.1 science algorithms. The concerns are 
summarized as shown in Table 2 below. 
Table 2  SAFER Concerns 
SAFER SCIENCE 
ISSUES 
METHOD VALIDATION COMMENTS 
  RANGE 
> K18 
RANGE 
<<K18 
PES Destruction Empirical Data Good Limited Lower Net Explosive Weight (NEW), Partial 
Destruction Fidelity 
PES Dynamic Mass 
Dist 
Empirical Data Acceptable Limited Improved Level 3 Analysis, Test Data 
PES Airblast 
Modification 
Empirical Data Good Limited Lower NEW, Shock Complexity, Gas Pressure 
PES Debris Blocking Empirical Data Acceptable Limited Needs Better Science, Test Data 
PES Crater Ejecta Empirical Data Limited Limited Better Science, Test Data 
PES Ground Shock N/A Acceptable Needed Requires Consideration 
ES Wall Damage P-I Level 2 Good Limited Improved Level 3 Analysis, Test Data 
ES Collapse & 
Beyond 
N/A Acceptable Needed Improved Level 3 Analysis 
ES  Blocking Factor Analytical 2 Acceptable Limited Improved Level 3 Analysis, Test Data 
ES Airblast 
Modification 
Analytical 2 Acceptable Uncertain Improved Level 3 Analysis, Test Data 
ES Glass Model P-I Level 3 Good Uncertain Improved Level 3 Analysis 
ES Glass % Limits Expert Opinion Marginal Uncertain Restrict Possible Area Choices 
ES KE Penetration 
Res 
Empirical Data Marginal Uncertain Kinetic energy (KE) Relationship To Area/Mass -Test 
Data 
Pf/e Independence Analytical 2 Acceptable Uncertain Close-in-Time Dependence Overlap 
ES Building Type 
Validity 
Analytical 2 Limited Uncertain Address Very Long Span Structures 
Pf/e Mechanism Analytical 2 Acceptable Uncertain Translation Sensitivity of Probability Density Function 
(PDF) Method 
5.1.3 Probability of a Fatality Given an Event and Effect 
Accurate fatality distribution for closer-scaled ranges contemplated in SAFER 3 and beyond will likely 
require level 3 science models capable of addressing orientation and localized variation in ES building 
damage. 
 
The annual exposure versus sequential operations needs more attention.  Migrating away from expert 
opinions to a more rigorous analysis is probably required in both the probability of an event and the 
association of fatalities.  Some thought should be given to this area, and an improved normalization of 
risk calculation should be performed.  
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5.1.4 Uncertainty 
The Peer Review Team is satisfied that APT has adequately addressed all of the uncertainty concerns 
addressed by the previous Peer Review Team when SAFER 3 has been released.  APT will add analysis 
within SAFER 3 that adequately covers the aleatory and epistemic mechanisms to cover and treat risks. 
5.1.5 User Interface 
A few minor title changes to the user interface screen would be appropriate (e.g., “Scaling factors” might 
be changed to “Environmental factors”).  The input screens should be more similar to the “User Settings 
for PES” screen to help the user better understand the inputs and the outputs. 
5.1.6 Limitations 
User input for building floor areas appears to have a number of issues that the reviewers did not 
understand.  As reviewed, it is possible for users to enter building floor areas for up to 99,999 square feet 
for any size building (<5000, 5000<20000, >20000).  This seems to be totally inconsistent with the 
analytical assumptions used to develop the building size groups. It also has the potential to allow a user to 
believe he is addressing all damage concerns by simply using the floor area he feels is appropriate without 
realizing the floor area only affects the glass risk and not the building structure type.  Thus, probability of 
building damage and horizontal and vertical debris damage may all be inappropriate for the floor 
area/building in question. In addition, the damage probabilities at the boundaries of building groups do 
not agree. For example, the probability of building damage for a 20,000-square-foot building in the 
5000<20000 group is not the same as the damage for the same building in the >20000 group.  Is this 
because the building damage is based on the upper bound of the group type? If so, that should be made 
clear.  However, Appendix G (“ACTA Structures Data”) of the user’s guide defines a 40,000-square-foot 
large structure class, not 99,999.  There is no comment in the criteria suggesting this size can be 
extrapolated up to the 99,999 limit now allowed in the user input and used for glass damage. Some other 
comments on Technical Paper 14 and the SAFER user’s guide include: 
 
• Technical Paper 14 and the user’s guide should consistently define how the user inputs range to 
the ES (e.g., center of PES to center of ES, or near edge to near edge).  
• The narrative in the user’s guide and Technical Paper 14 describing the floor area should be 
amplified to make user aware of the purpose and limitation of the term.  
• The description of the percentage glass area should be amplified to make it clear that it is related 
to the entered floor area not the building group size. 
• Clarify what the damage Pf/e for each building size is. Is it the damage at the upper size limit for 
each structure group? 
• Likewise, clarify what the horizontal and vertical debris damage are based on. Is it the upper 
bound of building size? 
• Review of Appendix G, page G-1 provides a very brief description of recommended user 
decisions, which seem confusing. This wording could be clarified regarding significance of the 
wall parameters and also the relationship of the floor area entry to the building types provided.      
5.1.7 Inputs/Outputs/Design 
The basic design of SAFER is adequate for what the code has been designed to address. Minor 
improvements in terminology could be made to the existing input screens and have been suggested.  A 
scenario capability (protocol) or sequence of operation method needs to be developed to allow the user to 
describe a base storage for explosives and movement of explosives into and out of storage.  In addition, 
the capability to address different environmental conditions (wind, rain, humidity, etc.) and their effects 
on the SAFER calculations should be considered.  Conceptually, multiple runs of SAFER would need to 
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be encapsulated for covering a complete scenario or set of scenarios (protocols) for a base analysis.  
Ideally, the user should be able to describe the scenario or set of scenarios and the complete analysis 
would be performed by SAFER and summary results presented for each major area of concern. 
5.1.8 Certifications/Validation/Verification/Commercialization 
From a government point of view, there seems to be an oversight by the DDESB on moving toward a 
formal certification of the SAFER code.  This would include the need for software V&V of the SAFER 
code.  The Peer Review Team highly recommends that it is time to formally approve the SAFER code for 
appropriate explosives risk evaluations.  It is our belief that the SAFER code deserves and should be 
formally certified for government use. 
 
The other related area is commercialization.  The Peer Review Team did not see or hear of any plan to 
commercialize the SAFER code.  We believe that commercialization of SAFER should be considered and 
a plan developed with a schedule to move toward this objective.  Consideration of potential users and 
demand for SAFER both in the U.S. and NATO communities should be considered as part of this process. 
5.2 Management 
5.2.1 Software Management/Development 
The methodology used in the SAFER software development activities was very structured and impressive 
in terms of software development approaches. The controls associated with tracking changes and 
document library check-ins are an excellent method to manage software development.  We strongly 
recommend the continuation of the current APT methods used in prior SAFER development. 
5.2.2 Program Management 
5.2.2.1 APT  
The multiple contract vehicles, piecemeal availability of funds, limited project task scheduling, and 
requirements creep all contributed to challenges in efficient performance of production work such as code 
development and validation.  This cannot be fixed by APT but needs addressing by the sponsors. 
5.2.2.2 Government/Sponsors 
It appears the government contribution to the team suffers by the nature of the funding stream, the “time 
and material” nature of the project planning and scheduling, and the difficulty in achieving a consistent 
contracting method.  
5.2.3 Vision of SAFER 
 
The reviewers believe that SAFER is maturing technically in a timely manner to meet the objective of the 
suggested vision statement. Development of more definitive DDESB implementation plan and service 
policy, a precedent for liability and public acceptance will all be controlling factors in the degree and rate 
of acceptance of the SAFER code. There are also other beneficial applications of SAFER within DoD 
which should be explored. 
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5.2.3.1 User 
There is a broad diversity of safety experience in end users for SAFER.  Refinement of training materials 
and objectives for end users can be beneficial. An improved definition and training requirements for each 
type of user should be developed. 
5.2.3.2 Standard Tool for DoD Explosives Safety Siting Work 
The Vision Statement and 6 year plan indicates that the long-range goal is for SAFER to be the standard 
tool for all DoD explosives safety siting. The implementation plan and schedule for this is not clear and 
appears to be uncertain at this time.  
5.2.3.3  There is Not a Clear and Binding Policy On How/When to Use SAFER. 
Continued, expanded use of SAFER will depend on how soon DDESB and the Services develop clear and 
binding policy.  As discussed in Section 4.2.3.3 continued improvement in application of policy will be 
beneficial. 
5.3 Cost and Management 
The generalized objectives and frequent changes that result from the PDT approach to management make 
it difficult to clearly define requirements, plan and allocate work performed against specific work items 
and the related cost.  The SAFER software development costs are misleading when quoted in the 
aggregate cost.  Management, consensus should probably be managed as separate contract elements. 
 
The reviewers believe that the program would benefit by a more structured approach to work planning, 
linked to the six-year plan and budgeted to specific WBS elements.  A relatively simple project network 
breakdown to two or three levels would probably be- adequate and would more clearly defend progress 
against funding.  It would also be beneficial to program management in justification of funding requests. 
5.3.1 Contract Management Approach 
The RBECT development of SAFER over the last six years has been accomplished through as many as 
five or more funding sources, which include the DDESB, Army, Navy, Marine Corp and Air Force. It is 
recommended that all contributors provide direct funds to a single contracting office for management by a 
single contracting officer and COTR.   
5.3.1.1 Requirements Definitions 
Activity 5 in Table 1 seems to be a separate activity from a normal software development project.  If this 
activity is necessary among the sponsoring organizations, then one should consider a separately funded 
project for this activity.  We believe the current approach for management of requirements has provided 
ill-defined requirements for APT and its software development team. 
5.3.1.2 The Product Development Team (PDT) 
The PDT approach utilized by the RBESCT has been very successful in developing a common vision, 
stakeholder buy-in and leveraging of the special skills and expertise of the government and the contractor. 
The limitations on the PDT approach to management are typically in program management discipline and 
development of clear and measurable requirements.  Without clearly stated objectives, requirement creep 
is common.  
 
It is suggested that a matrix of proposed objectives be developed for each major area of the SAFER 
methodology.  Each matrix should rank-order the priority of the activities to be considered. A unified 
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matrix which prioritizes requirements against funds can then be developed and ranked by the RBESCT.  
This would drive the near-term focus for requirements. 
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Appendix B: Glossary  
List of Variable Names and Symbols 
 
Variable Definition 
Ei Individual exposure 
Pe Probability of event 
Pf|e Probability of fatality given an event 
Pf Probability of a fatality 
 
Definitions 
 
One of the largest difficulties in risk analyses is clear communications.  Often words have many meanings 
leading to misunderstandings.  In this document, the definitions below are used.  
 
Acceptable risk - a predetermined criterion or standard for a maximum risk ceiling. 
 
Accident - that occurrence in a sequence of events that usually produces unintended injury, death or 
property damage.  
 
Collective risk - the total risk to an exposed population; the expected total number of individuals who will 
be fatalities. Defined as expected fatalities.  
 
Expected fatalities - the expected number of individuals who will be fatalities from an unexpected event. 
This risk is expressed with the following notation: 1E-7 = 10-7 = 1 fatality in ten million person years. 
 
Exposure - the number of times per year an individual is exposed to the potential explosives event. 
 
Hazard - any real or potential condition that can cause injury, illness, or death of personnel or damage to 
or loss of equipment or property.  
 
Hazardous event - event that causes harm. 
 
Individual risk - the risk to any particular individual, either a worker or a member of the public. A 
member of the public can be defined either as anybody living at a defined radius from an establishment or 
somebody following a particular pattern of life. 
 
Maximum individual risk - the highest level of risk to any one person for a given event.  
 
Population at risk - a limited population that may be unique for a specific explosives risk. 
 
Probability of fatality - the likelihood that a person or persons will die from an unexpected event.  
 
Risk - a measure that takes into consideration both the probability of occurrence and the consequence of a 
hazard. Risk is measured in the same units as the consequence such as number of injuries, fatalities, or 
dollar loss.  
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Risk analysis - a detailed examination including risk assessment, risk evaluation, and risk management 
alternatives, performed to understand the nature of unwanted, negative consequences to human life, 
health, property, or the environment; an analytical process to provide information regarding undesirable 
events; the process of quantification of the probabilities and expected consequences for identified risks.  
 
Risk assessment - the process of establishing information regarding acceptable levels of a risk and/or 
levels of risk for an individual, group, society, or the environment.  
 
Risk evaluation - a component of risk assessment in which judgments are made about the significance and 
acceptability of risk.  
 
Safety - relative protection from adverse consequences.  In this context, Safety = 1 – Risk. 
 
Scenario – in the SAFER context, a scenario is a set of conditions that are under evaluation.  In a 
scenario, conditions are not static. 
 
Situation – in the SAFER context, a situation is the set of static conditions that are under evaluation 
similar to a scenario.  Static refers to the period of time under evaluation (i.e., one year for SAFER). 
 
Societal risk - the risk to society as a whole (for example, the chance of a large accident causing a defined 
number of deaths or injuries).  
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